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ABSTRACT
We are living in an inter-connected, global digital society where the
services of different operating systems are universal in nature, but
many Internet activities are still being tackled by national laws
and regulations. A long-existing question is which law is
applicable in cases of Internet activities because the online world
does not have any physical boundaries. How the European Union
(EU) approaches this duality has become a concern for data
protection laws. By analysing some recent Court of Justice of the
European Union case laws, this article seeks to discover how the
EU data protection law tackles disputes involving transnational
issues online, which includes its extra-territorial application and
cross-border data transfers. The article also indicates that there is
an enormous gap between legislation and practice.
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1. Introduction
Much like cyberspace, communication is nowadays of cross-border nature. The Internet,
including well-known websites and social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Wiki-
pedia and YouTube, is the prime medium for communication among people around the
world. It is difficult to find any undoubtedly accepted international legal instrument to
safeguard privacy and data protection of Internet users across the world although this
area of law has become crucial for worldwide communication.
The Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of
Personal Data of 1981 (CETS No.: 108) is regarded as the first and only legally binding inter-
national instrument that, along with the European Union (EU) Member States, is accessible
by non-European as well as non-member countries of the Council of Europe that explicitly
deals with data protection, information privacy and personal data considering gradual
technological development.1 Provisions on cross-border personal data flows to and
from non-Member States were introduced by the Additional Protocol to Convention
108 that was adopted in 2001, which encourages the fair and legitimate collection, proces-
sing and use of personal data. In reality, all contracting parties to the Convention except
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2004) <http://goo.gl/D2Rihm>.




































Uruguay are members of the Council of Europe, turning it far from ‘international’ in
practice.2
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Privacy Frame-
work states in its point 16: ‘A data controller remains accountable for personal data under
its control without regard to the location of the data’.3 But this framework is a non-binding
instrument.4
The Data Protection Directive (DPD) of 19955 is claimed to be the first and only effective
international data protection legal instrument through which national laws are authorised
to be applied in particular cases of data processing.6 Scholars in the related field are
expecting that the latest EU data protection legislation– the General Data Protection Regu-
lation7 (GDPR) is going to be the most influential regional legal instrument in data protec-
tion law with universal proximity that will encounter more international acceptance.
Because of the diffusive and universal nature of the Internet,8 the general privacy pol-
icies and end-user license agreements of different websites, mobile applications and oper-
ating systems are also the same across borders. At the same time, aside from a very few
international and regional legal instruments, data protection laws are mostly determined
by national parliaments.
Under the general principle of territoriality, state jurisdiction to enforce a law includes
the territory upon which the state can exercise sovereign power. The extra-territorial appli-
cation of national law is possible only if any international law permits this where the
country in question is a Member State of that particular international law.9 With regard
to data protection law, now it is quite challenging to adjust present extra-territorial
issues online against traditional principles of territoriality.
Transnational data flow has become inevitable with the expansion of the Internet. Pro-
visions of the DPD were outlined in order to protect the personal data of EU residents pre-
scribing the limits of activities of the EU-based controllers. Transferring data from the EU to
third countries means that a data controller within the EU first collects and then transfers
data to the controller or processor of the third country. Thus, the legal aspects of transfer-
ring data to third countries involve some practical complexities that require two different
actors in both sides as data controller and controller or processor.10 The first controller is
undoubtedly bound to follow the provisions of the EU data protection law, but disputes
can arise regarding the applicable law for the latter controller and/or processor.
2Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Handbook on Euro-
pean Data Protection Law (2014) 16, 17; Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 108 <http://www.coe.int/en/web/
conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/108/signatures?p_auth=BOL2XLFM>.
3OECD, The OECD Privacy Framework (2013) <http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf>.
4Elena Perotti, ‘The European Ruling on the Right to be Forgotten and Its Extra-EU Implementation’ (2015) 29 <http://www.
academia.edu/19648451/The_European_Ruling_on_the_Right_to_be_Forgotten_and_its_extra-EU_implementation>.
5Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L281/31.
6Lee A. Bygrave, ‘Data Privacy Law: An International Perspective’ (Oxford University Press, 2014), 63.
7Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the
free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC 2016) OJ L119/1.
8Anabela Susana De Sousa Gonçalves, ‘The Extraterritorial Application of the EU Directive on Data Protection’ Spanish Year-
book of International Law (2015) 195.
9Perotti (n 4) 26.





































However, the GDPR attempts to govern both actors with some improved obligations when
a connection to the EU exists.
A general principle is that the law of the country from which the data are collected is
applicable to the controller until the actual transfer takes place. Thus, it is the legal obli-
gation of the regional branches within the EU of any parent company to follow the EU
data protection law.11 For example, the social networking platform Facebook was origi-
nated and based in the United States, but now is popular worldwide. Normally, large
amounts of users’ personal (including location) data are processed via social networking
websites/applications such as Facebook used in smart devices.12 A big concern is how
the EU data protection law would be applied in cases of data processing by Facebook.
As per the definition under Article 2(e) DPD and Article 4(8) GDPR, by processing individual
personal data, Facebook becomes the ‘data processor’. Because technical decisions are
taken in the head office, including ‘the purposes and means’ of the data processing, it
can be said that EU nationals’ data are processed by a US-based data controller [under
Article 2(d) DPD and Article 4(7) GDPR].13
In this connection, it is relevant to mention that Facebook attempted to escape EU
national laws by reference to Irish law only terming Facebook Ireland as data controller
by fulfilling the ‘establishment’ test under Article 4(1)(a) DPD. But the High Court of
Berlin disagreed with this argument in 2014.14 Facebook continued the same argument
that because Facebook’s European headquarters is located in Dublin, Ireland, Facebook
is only bound to comply with the national laws of Ireland.15 The President of the Brussels
Court of First Instance on November 2015 adopted the recommendation made by the
Privacy Commission of Belgium on May 2015 and held that Facebook, Inc. is the data con-
troller, and Facebook Ireland is not the data controller because it is not competent and
independent to determine ‘the purposes and means of the processing of personal
data’.16 Thus, Facebook Ireland and Facebook Belgium are only subsidiaries of Facebook,
Inc.17
The head offices of many multinational technology companies are situated in the
United States, and many of those do not have any regional offices within the EU. In
these cases, it is technically possible that the US-based companies can directly obtain
data from their worldwide users. In the absence of any intermediary or controller in the
EU, complexities may arise to define ‘data transfer’. In other words, when EU users send
their personal data to the United States without a transferring authority, and the US-
based technology companies process those data, whether the issue falls within the
ambit of international application of the EU data protection law has become a crucial
11Kuczerawy (n 10) 80; European Commission, Protection of Personal Data <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/>.
12Jeroen van den Hoven and others, ‘Privacy and Information Technology’ in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition) <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/it-privacy/>.
13Kuczerawy (n 10) 78, 79.
14Tim Van Canneyt, ‘The Belgian Facebook Recommendation: How the Nomination of a Single EU Data Controller Is Under
Fire’ Privacy, Security and Information Law (20 May 2015) <http://privacylawblog.fieldfisher.com/2015/the-belgian-
facebook-recommendation-how-the-nomination-of-a-single-eu-data-controller-is-under-fire>.
15Columbia University, Global Freedom of Expression, Belgian Privacy Commission v. Facebook <https://
globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/belgian-privacy-commission-v-facebook/>.
16Belgian Privacy Commission v. Facebook, Recommendation no. 04/2015 of 13 May 2015, Date of Decision: 9 November
2015; Columbia University (n 15).
17Canneyt (n 14); Marcus Evans and Jay Modrall, ‘Belgian Court Orders Facebook to Stop Tracking Non-members, Rejects FB’s
Assertion of Lack of Jurisdiction’, Data Protection Report (23 November 2015) <http://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2015/
11/belgian-court-orders-facebook-to-stop-tracking-non-members-rejects-fbs-assertion-of-lack-of-jurisdiction/>.



































question. Multinational technology companies have become so powerful that they are
capable enough to collect, transfer, and then process personal data from the online activi-
ties of Internet users worldwide. Whether or not an actual ‘transfer’ takes place within the
meaning of the provisions of the DPD and GDPR, the result is the same (i.e. the US
company processes the personal data of EU users).18 However, it was expressed in the
Lindqvist case19 that merely uploading personal data to the Internet would not constitute
a ‘transfer’, although that data could be accessed from any part of the world.20
Taking into account these dimensions, this article discusses cross-border issues by
including two aspects: (1) extra-territorial application of the EU data protection law and
(2) data transfers from the EU to the outside. The judgement of the renowned Google
Spain case21 strengthens the scope of applicability of the EU data protection law concern-
ing extra-territorial jurisdiction and the Schrems case22 ensures both the extra-territorial
applicability and lawful transfers of personal data under the EU data protection law.
Both cases have fostered subsequent developments in the EU data protection law with
regards to personal data protection. Because of some unforeseen consequences of the
digital environment with the passage of time, it appeared from these judgements that
the provisions under the EU data protection law may be interpreted taking into account
the consequences and realities of data processing. Although the GDPR is eager to apply
from May 2018 [Art. 99(2) GDPR] repealing the DPD, discussing the DPD is inevitable
because the judgements of the two cases were based on the provisions of the DPD.
Without analysing them, the present developments (GDPR, Privacy Shield) would be
incomplete.
Therefore, the next chapters of the paper are arranged as follows. Alongside an analysis
of the related provisions of the DPD, Chapter II consists of discussions on Google Spain and
subsequent development in the GDPR. In a similar order the Schrems case is discussed in
Chapter III, followed by an analysis of the EU-US Privacy Shield in Chapter IV. For further
clarification, Chapter II is relevant before the transfer of personal data outside the EU
region, Chapter III discusses aspects both before and after the transfer happens, and
Chapter IV is particularly focused on post-transfer concerns.
2. Extra-territorial jurisdiction
Article 4 of the DPD provides legal basis against ‘conflict of laws’23 that clarifies which
national law of the Member States applies ‘in the context of the activities of an establish-
ment’ [Art. 4(1)(a)], or if an equipment is used [Art. 4(1)(c)] within the territory of the said
Member State in order to process personal data, provided that national laws are not
arranged in conflict with the DPD. This provision is particularly relevant in processing
data before it is transferred to third countries, irrespective of an establishment located
within the EU or use of equipment within the EU by some association situated outside
18Kuczerawy (n 10) 80, 81.
19Bodil Lindqvist v Åklagarkammaren i Jönköping (CJEU, 6 November 2003) C-101/01, ECLI:EU:C:2002:513.
20Mark Watts, The Bodil Lindqvist Case: ECJ Rules on Publishing Personal Data on the Internet (Bristows, 17 November 2003)
<http://www.bristows.com/news-and-publications/articles/the-bodil-lindqvist-case-ecj-rules-on-publishing-personal-
data-on-the-internet/#nogo>.
21Google Spain et al. v AEPD, Costeja Gonzales, C-131/12 (CJEU, 13 May 2014) ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.
22Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, Ireland, C-362/14 (CJEU, 6 October 2015) ECLI:EU:C:2015:650.
23Conflict of laws arises where different jurisdictions provide different provisions on a same subject matter, and it becomes




































of the EU.24 Article 4, in connection to territorial applicability and enforceability of the DPD,
is somewhat complex and keeps scope for several interpretations, especially in determin-
ing an equipment under Article 4(1)(c) of the DPD.25
2.1. Google Spain case
Spanish citizen and lawyer Mario Costeja González filed a complaint with the national Data
Protection Agency of Spain (AEPD) against the Spanish newspaper La Vanguardia and
Google Spain and Google Inc. in March 2010.26 He alleged that his right to privacy as
well as ‘right to be forgotten’ was infringed by making searchable on Google the news
published in La Vanguardia regarding an already resolved issue of judicial proceeding
endured by him about 12 years ago concerning recovery of debt by forced sale of prop-
erty, which he claimed ‘entirely irrelevant’.27 The complainant requested the defendants to
remove or make inaccessible his personal information with offending contents.28
The AEPD did not find the La Vanguardia guilty because it published the news lawfully
in accordance with a government order.29 However, Google Spain and Google Inc. were
held liable for processing personal data and were requested to remove such data from
search results. By prohibiting access to particular data, Internet search engines are
thereby held subject to the EU data protection laws.30 Google appealed against the
decision to the National High Court of Spain, which referred it to the Court of Justice of
the European Union (CJEU). The CJEU issued its judgement in May 2014, finding Google
as ‘controller’ under Article 2(d), and its activities were classified as ‘processing of personal
data’ under Article 2(b) of the DPD.31
By finding Google Spain as an ‘establishment’ of Google Inc. under Article 4(1)(a) and
within the meaning of Recital 19 of the DPD, the CJEU found them ‘inextricably linked’
and thereby permitted interpretation of the DPD with extra-territorial jurisdiction.32 Per-
sonal data processing was carried out ‘in the context of an establishment of the controller’
in the EU where a branch or subsidiary promoting and selling advertising space was tar-
geting the inhabitants of a Member State (ruling, point 2).
2.2. Influence of the case and subsequent developments
The most important finding for the topic in this judgement concerns the territorial scope
of the DPD and reach of national laws of the EU Member States outside national bound-
aries. It is now established that Article 4(1)(a) can be applied with extra-territorial
24Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 01/2016 on the EU – U.S. Privacy Shield Draft Adequacy Decision (13 April
2016) 12.
25Kuczerawy (n 10) 84.
26Perotti (n 4) 4.
27Perotti (n 4) 4.
28European Commission, Factsheet on the ‘Right to be Forgotten’ Ruling (C-131/12) <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/files/factsheets/factsheet_data_protection_en.pdf>.
29Columbia University, Global Freedom of Expression, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos <https://
globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/google-spain-sl-v-agencia-espanola-de-proteccion-de-datos-aepd/>.
30Ibid; Google Spain SL v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (5RB: Media and Entertainment Law, 20 February 2017)
<http://www.5rb.com/case/google-spain-sl-v-agencia-espanola-de-proteccion-de-datos/>.
31Perotti (n 4) 6.
32Brendan Van Alsenoy and Marieke Koekkoek, ‘Internet and Jurisdiction after Google Spain: The Extraterritorial Reach of
the EU’s “Right to be Forgotten”’ (Working Paper No. 152, March 2015) 8, 9.



































jurisdiction. Accordingly, provisions of the EU data protection law will apply in the case of
search engine operations through a branch or a divisional office within any Member State
of the EU, even if the main company originated and is based outside of the EU.33 Hence, in
practical terms, the DPD (and nowadays the GDPR) can be interpreted as not only a
regional but also an international data protection law.34
Thus, the territorial scope of the EU data protection law is described broadly in the
Google Spain case. Through this judgement, national legislation and its jurisdiction to
the extra-European activity has been extended in practice.35 Perhaps the court took this
broad approach considering the tremendous and boundless spread of the virtual world
and to fit that spread in the existing data protection law, which was adopted in the
1990s when the legislators could not foresee the probable influence of the Internet in
the future.36
In last several years, modern technologies have evolved drastically. With the borderless
nature and wide-spread use of the Internet, the GDPR has been developed to embrace the
consequences brought by the new digital environment and for the protection of funda-
mental rights within such an environment. The most important change that the GDPR
brings with regulatory landscape is regarding the personal data protection of EU residents,
which binds all companies or operating systems that process EU residents’ personal data,
irrespective of the location of the company or operating system in question. The GDPR
extends, modernises and clarifies the jurisdictional scope of the EU data protection
law.37 With the phrase ‘offering goods or services’ stated in different provisions of the
GDPR, it binds the companies operating from outside the EU that provide services for
the consumers in the EU and process EU data subjects’ data.38
Article 3 and Recital 22 of the GDPR clarify the territorial scope so that when controllers
or processors process personal data with any of their establishments in the EU, the GDPR
will be applicable ‘regardless of whether the processing itself takes place within the Union’
or not. It is a change in the data protection law that, with the GDPR, the relevance of the
location of the equipment is replaced by a focus on people in the EU. The GDPR applies to
processing in connection with the activities of an establishment in the EU regardless of
where the processing happens (e.g. cloud storage abroad).39
The enforcement of Article 4(1)(c) of the DPD is not very easy in practice because of the
ambiguity in determiningwhat constitutes ‘equipment’. Article 29 Data ProtectionWorking
Party (A29WP) suggested to apply Article 4(1)(c) in concrete cases for example, only when it
is reasonable and necessary.40 The philosophy behind such an approach may be that the
users can get the feeling of personal data protection and privacy under their own national
legislation in reasonable circumstances. On the other hand, it may not be wise to expect
33Factsheet on the ‘Right to be Forgotten Ruling’ (n 28).
34Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on Determining the International Application of EU Data Pro-
tection Law to Personal Data Processing on the Internet by Non-EU Based Web Sites (30 May 2002) 3–12.
35Perotti (n 4) 14.
36Perotti (n 4) 35.
37‘GDPR Key Changes: An Overview of the Main Changes Under GPDR and How They Differ from the Previous Directive’ (EU
GDPR Portal) <http://www.eugdpr.org/key-changes.html>.
38Allen and Overy, ‘The EU General Data Protection Regulation’ (2016) 3 <http://www.allenovery.com/
SiteCollectionDocuments/Radical%20changes%20to%20European%20data%20protection%20legislation.pdf>.
39Eduardo Ustaran (eds), ‘Future-proofing Privacy: A Guide to Preparing for the EU Data Protection Regulation’ (Hogan
Lovells, June 2015) 8, 9.




































legal treatment from a third country except with a concrete ground. In case of contradiction
between national law of EU Member States and other international laws that are not only
concerned about the EU but also the whole world, a matter of big debate is how the terri-
toriality principle would be applied and whether to prefer national law over international
law would be undermining for the international law.41
Overcoming such ambiguity is attempted with a new and simple test introduced by the
GDPR. The GDPR will be applicable to the activities of the data controller or processor not
established within the EU territory, if goods or services are offered to data subjects or their
behaviour is monitored within the EU [Art. 3 (2), Recital 23 GDPR]. In such a case, if the con-
trollers or processors are established outside the EU region, they are required to appoint
representatives in the Union or more specifically, in the concerned Member State (Art. 27,
Recital 80).42
3. Cross-border data transfers
Article 25(1) of the DPD states that Member States permit transfer of personal data for the
purpose of data processing only if ‘an adequate level of protection’ is ensured by the third
country. According to Article 25(2), there is no exact standard to assess such adequacy, but
it could be assessed considering the facts and circumstances related to the data transfer
operation/s, including the nature, purpose and duration of data processing; the concerned
countries to and from where the data would be transferred; and existing legal systems of
those countries.
Article 26(1) of the DPD provides some specific circumstances of derogations from the
requirement of adequate protection of data under Article 25. Those circumstances are
sketched in a way where the threat to privacy rights of the data subject is comparatively
low or in order to safeguard other interests or public interests that are more important
than the right to privacy of the data subject.43 If a data subject gives unambiguous
consent, the transfer of personal data without ensuring the adequate protection may
take place [Art. 26(1)(a)]. For the performance of a contract between the data subject
and controller [Art. 26(1)(b)] or between controller and third party for the interest of the
data subject [Art. 26(1)(c)], on the ground of public interest or legal requirements [Art.
26(1)(d)] or for the protection of the data subject’s vital interest [Art. 26(1)(e)], the ade-
quacy requirement can be exempted. The scope of these exemptions may seem wide,
but to apply them the ‘necessity test’ is required in order to limit the scope.44
The requirement of ensuring an adequate level of protection might be exempted under
Article 26(2) of the DPD by virtue of which Member States are authorised to transfer data
to third countries where ‘adequate safeguards’ are offered by the controller for the protec-
tion of individuals’ privacy and fundamental rights, particularly resulting from contractual
clauses. It should be noted that when a general principle permits derogations, that should
be applied restrictively.45
41Kuczerawy (n 10) 84.
42Hunton & Williams, ‘The EU General Data Protection Regulation: A Guide for In-house Lawyers’ (Hunton & Williams,
October 2016) 10.
43Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries: Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the EU
Data Protection Directive (24 July 1998) 24.
44A29WP, Transfers of Personal Data (n 43) 24.
45A29WP, Transfers of Personal Data (n 43) 15.



































In this context, discussing the Safe Harbour Agreement46 and related dispute is extre-
mely important. The Safe Harbour Agreement, which allowed EU citizens’ data transfer
from EU to the United States, was declared invalid by the CJEU in Maximillian Schrems v
Data Protection Commissioner for a number of reasons, as discussed below.47
3.1. The Schrems case
Austrian national Maximillian Schrems has used Facebook since 2008. He brought a com-
plaint to the Data Protection Commissioner of Ireland that Facebook transferred his data
from Facebook’s Irish servers to the United States, based on the disclosures by Edward
Snowden in 2013 of the surveillance actions by the US intelligence agency. Thereby
Schrems claimed that the requirement to ensure adequate data protection under EU
law failed.48 The Irish Data Protection Agency dismissed the claim, stating that adequate
protection was ensured under the Safe Harbour Agreement.49
The case was then submitted to the High Court of Ireland and its evaluation was sub-
sequently accepted by the CJEU.50 However, the CJEU declared the Safe Harbour
Decision invalid and delivered some important findings along with the cross-border
issues.
It was expressed that the Safe Harbour Agreement was not meant to reduce, interfere
or eliminate the authority of national data protection agencies under the DPD or Charter of
Fundamental Rights (CFR) of the EU.51 The adequacy of data protection in third countries
under Article 25(1) could not be ensured if any kind of prejudice occurred to the EU
Member States’ national laws framed ‘pursuant to’ the provisions of the DPD. The CJEU
held that before determining such adequacy, the European Commission was supposed
to be confirmed that the domestic law of the third country (i.e. US domestic law) or its
international commitments protect the right to the protection of personal data which
should be ‘essentially equivalent’ to that as guaranteed under the DPD and CFR.52 But
the Commission with its Decision of 2000,53 did not explore such legal background and
only explored the Safe Harbour scheme.54
The court found that the US public authorities were kept immune from the applicability
of the Safe Harbour scheme; rather, the scheme was meant to apply to the US-owned
undertakings.55 The court ruled:
46Commission Decision 2000/520/EC of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related frequently asked
questions issued by the US Department of Commerce (OJ 2000 L215).
47Samuel Gibbs, ‘What Is ‘safe harbour’ and Why Did the EUCJ Just Declare It Invalid?’ The Guardian (6 October 2015)
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/oct/06/safe-harbour-european-court-declare-invalid-data-
protection>.
48Court of Justice of the European Union, Press Release No. 117/15 (Luxembourg, 6 October 2015).
49Martin A. Weiss and Kristin Archick, ‘U.S.-EU Data Privacy: From Safe Harbor to Privacy Shield’ (Congressional Research
Service, 19 May 2016) 6.
50Thomas Claburn, ‘Safe Harbor Fails, European Court Rules’ InformationWeek (19 May 2016) <http://www.
informationweek.com/government/cybersecurity/safe-harbor-fails-european-court-rules/d/d-id/1322509>.
51Weiss and Archick (n 49) 7.
52Sidley, ‘Essentially Equivalent: A Comparison of the Legal Orders for Privacy and Data Protection in the European Union
and United States’ (January 2016) 9, 10 <http://www.sidley.com/~/media/publications/essentially-equivalent---final.
pdf>; Weiss and Archick (n 49) 7.
53Commission Decision 2000/520/EC (n 46).
54Press Release No. 117/15 (n 48).




































Once the personal data has been transferred to the United States, it is capable of being
accessed by the NSA and other federal agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), in the course of the indiscriminate surveillance and interception carried out by them on a
large scale.56
Thus, the US law enforcement requirements, including assurance of national security and
public interest, received preference over the Safe Harbour frame, and in case of any con-
flict between them, the US public authorities would prevail, allowing the US undertakings
to ignore the Safe Harbour principles.57 Thereby, through the Safe Harbour Agreement,
the US authority became capable of interfering with the personal data that had been trans-
ferred from the EU to the United States. US law does not provide any provision to limit
such interference and, thereby, could cause interference in the right to respect for one’s
private life.58
The court also found that with the Safe Harbour project, the power of national courts in
the EU was somehow narrowed to decide on the fundamental right to privacy upon an
individual’s petition, which the European Commission is not authorised to do. As a
result of this judgement, the supervisory authority of Ireland becomes competent to
decide on the complaint of Maximillian Schrems.59
3.2. Consequence of the judgement on cross-border issues
The Schrems case is very important to ensure protection of personal data when the
matter involves cross-border issues in connection to the EU data protection law. The
judgement of this case provides strong grounds to interpret the EU data protection
law in the EU users’ favour to protect personal data and privacy even outside EU the
region.
Even before this judgement A29WP expressed that, Article 4 of the DPD should not be
affected by the Safe Harbour programme.60 This implies that the purpose of the Safe
Harbour principles was not to replace the applicable national laws drawn in accordance
with the DPD.61
US-based giant multinational technology companies, including Google, Facebook,
Apple and Microsoft, are no longer allowed lawfully to transfer users’ data automatically.
In doing so, they need to adopt ‘model contract clauses’ for each incident of data transfer
from the EU to the United States complying with the EU regulations.62 Accordingly, after
this judgement, numerous companies started to adopt model/standard contractual
clauses for the continuation of transferring data in accordance with the European Commis-
sion decisions on contractual clauses.63 Adoption of such clauses could be a temporary
56Claburn (n 50).
57Weiss and Archick (n 49) 7.
58Weiss and Archick (n 49) 7.
59Press Release No. 117/15 (n 48).
60Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2000 on the Level of Protection Provided by the ‘Safe Harbor Principles’
(16 May 2000) 3.
61Kuczerawy (n 10) 81.
62Gibbs (n 47).
63European Commission, Justice, Model Contracts for the Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries <http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/data-protection/international-transfers/transfer/index_en.htm>; Tanguy Van Overstraeten and Alexandre Entray-
gues, The European Court of Justice to Rule on the Validity of Standard Contractual Clauses (Linklaters, 30 May 2016) 1,
2. <file://atkk/home/b/bupasha/Desktop/Extra%20territorial/standard_contractual_clauses.pdf>.



































solution, but in the long run it may not seem effective being unable to prevent generalised
surveillance measures by US government agencies.64
It has been a matter of apprehension whether this judgement would result in giant
technology companies only theoretically or really bringing effective changes in practice
in case of processing EU citizens’ personal data, though many of those companies have
started to build some data centres within the EU territory in order to manage EU citizens’
personal data.65 Thus, the judgement provides improved data protection by limiting
unauthorised access, transfer and processing of data and mass surveillance measures
over personal activities online by those companies and law enforcement agencies in
the United States.66
3.3. Transnational data transfers under GDPR
Data transfer to third countries is allowed under the GDPR if the European Commission
considers the legal system of those countries as providing an ‘adequate’ level of personal
data protection (Recital 103). Chapter V (Arts. 44–49) of the GDPR describes cross-border
data transfers including some important improvements in relation to the DPD.67
Like the DPD, the GDPR requires adequacy determinations with the additional
possibility of data transfer. Transfer by way of model clauses would not require any
prior notification or specific authorisation from supervisory authorities (Arts. 44, 45, 46
GDPR).68
The GDPR not only facilitates transnational data transfers with improved mechanisms
but also provides procedures, conditions and restrictions for personal data transfers
outside the EU, to third countries or to ‘a territory or specified sector within a third
country, or an international organisation’ upon the European Commission’s adequacy
decision (Recitals 103–107, 169, Art. 45).69
It is interesting that the requirement of ‘essential equivalence’, as expressed in Schrems
case, is reflected in Recital 104 of the GDPR. In order to determine the adequacy, the Euro-
pean Commission takes into account a number of factors, such as the existing legal
system, criminal law and access to justice in the country in question; individual processing
activities; and international human rights requirements. The Commission is supposed to
conduct periodic review and may recognise inadequacy in the level of data protection
and prohibit further transfer of personal data in consultation with related appropriate
bodies (Recitals 106, 107).70
Article 46(1) of the GDPR allows transfer of personal data if the receiver country or
organisation as the controller or processor provides ‘appropriate safeguards’ with data
subjects’ enforceable rights and effective legal remedies. The procedure, probable con-
tents and providing authorities of such safeguards is described in Recitals 108–110, 114
and Article 46 of the GDPR.
64Overstraeten and Entraygues (n 63) 2.
65Gibbs (n 47).
66Gibbs (n 47).
67Anna Myers, ‘Top 10 Operational Impacts of the GDPR: Part 4 – Cross-border Data Transfers’ (19 January 2016) <https://
iapp.org/news/a/top-10-operational-impacts-of-the-gdpr-part-4-cross-border-data-transfers/>.
68Hunton & Williams (n 42) 32, 33.






































In addition, the GDPR provides extended possibilities for the lawful transfer of personal
data. Thus, in particular circumstances, for example, by using standard contractual clauses
(Art. 46), approved code of conduct (Art. 40) or binding corporate rules (Art. 47), the adequate
safeguards might be insured, and accordingly, data might be transferred to non-EU countries
under the GDPR even without an adequacy requirement.71 In addition, Article 42 introduces
a new arrangement for transfers by way of certifications, on condition of controllers’ or pro-
cessors’ binding and enforceable commitments in applying the appropriate safeguards.72
Article 48 and Recital 115 introduce a new provision to the GDPR in relation to the DPD.
It describes if a court, tribunal or administrative body of a third country has ordered trans-
fer of personal data that is not otherwise authorised by the GDPR. Such transfer may be
recognised or enforced only if there exists ‘an international agreement, such as a
mutual legal assistance treaty, in force between the requesting third country and the
Union or a Member State’, without prejudicing other provisions relating to data transfer
in the GDPR. Such a provision undoubtedly provides additional protection of personal
data to EU residents by limiting particular circumstances of data transfer. However,
because the DPD did not have such a provision, the application and interpretation of
Article 48 is still quite uncertain and challenging.73
The GDPR continues the same derogations as in the DPD and, at the same time, permits
transfer to meet the controller’s legitimate interests only in limited circumstances.74 Dero-
gations from adequacy decisions and appropriate safeguards are permitted, for example,
with the data subject’s explicit consent, for the performance of contract and, for public
interest, legal claims or controller’s legitimate interest, as described in Article 49 and Reci-
tals 111, 112 and 113.
A significant improvement in the GDPR in relation to the DPD is, as per Article 83(5), a
heavy monetary fine of up to 20 million euros, or 4% of the annual worldwide turnover
(whichever is higher) that might be imposed for transfers of personal data in violation
of the provisions in Articles 44–49.75 Multinational technology companies should
employ an independent data protection officer (Arts. 37–39) while operating their services
within the EU.76
4. The EU-US Privacy Shield: an updated instrument to face recent
technical developments and its interface with GDPR
After the Safe Harbour judgement, both the EU and US authorities drafted an improved
new agreement in order to protect personal data and ensure cross-border data flows in
co-operation with the national authorities,77 which also includes commercial aspects of
personal data exchange between transatlantic regions.78
71Tracey Stretton and Lauren Grest, ‘How Will the New EU-US Privacy Shield Fit with the Upcoming General Data Protection
Regulation?’ (22 April 2016) <http://www.scmagazineuk.com/how-will-the-new-eu-us-privacy-shield-fit-with-the-
upcoming-general-data-protection-regulation/article/486513/>.
72Myers (n 67).
73David J. Kessler, Jamie Nowak, and Sumera Khan, ‘The Potential Impact of Article 48 of the General Data Protection Regu-
lation on Cross Border Discovery from the United States’ (2016) 17(2) The Sedona Conference Journal 577.
74Hunton & Williams (n 42) 32, 33.
75Stretton and Grest (n 71).
76Stretton and Grest (n 71).
77Weiss and Archick (n 49) 8.
78A29WP Opinion 01/2016 (n 24) 2.



































Because the Safe Harbour Agreement lacked data protection standards and was
arranged long before the current expansion of the Internet, it was not welcomed by
many European data protection advocates. The expansion of new technologies during
the last several years has opened a multifarious medium of collection and processing of
personal data; therefore, the Safe Harbour Agreement was bound to be revised because
in many respects it appeared as not current enough to tackle situations arising as a
result of the latest technologies.79
The Safe Harbour Agreement was criticised for separate allegations against the US
intelligence agency and the US-based technology companies taking part in unauthorised
surveillance activities as well as some aligned interference activities by both were pre-
sumed by many European data protection scholars and EU officials. For the sake of
economy and business relations in this era of globalisation, the issue was overlooked
many years.80
Starting before the Safe Harbour judgement and continuing until early 2016 was a dis-
cussion about a better document to replace the Safe Harbour. Taking into account the pre-
vious concerns about Safe Harbour, a draft version of a new agreement named the EU-US
Privacy Shield was released on 29 February 2016 by the EU and US authorities.81 The Euro-
pean Commission adopted its decision of the EU-US Privacy Shield82 and the annexes to
the decision83 on 12 July 2016. The Privacy Shield principles become relevant only when
the data are transferred from the EU to the United States.84
By reviewing the draft agreement, A29WP has published its opinion on the EU-US
Privacy Shield, which is non-binding but very relevant to explain the EU approach on
cross-boundary data flow.85 In doing so, the A29WP took into account the business
aspects, fundamental rights to privacy and data protection and power of national
authorities.86
The European Data Protection Supervisor and A29WP found the Privacy Shield as a
development and significantly improved over the Safe Harbour Decision, and the 13 rec-
ommendations outlined by the European Commission were responded to by the Privacy
Shield.87 It is very important that the level of protection in third countries is equally main-
tained as it is meant in the EU when protecting fundamental rights to privacy and data
protection under the DPD (nowadays in GDPR) and CFR.88 The Privacy Shield imposes
improved commitments for US organisations to protect personal data transferred from
the EU, which includes the obligation to provide notice in a comprehensive way, a
79A29WP Opinion 01/2016 (n 24) 2.
80Weiss and Archick (n 49) 9.
81Weiss and Archick (n 49) 9.
82Commission Implementing Decision of 12.7.2016 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-US Privacy Shield <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/files/privacy-shield-adequacy-decision_en.pdf>.
83Annexes to the Commission Implementing Decision pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-US Privacy Shield <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/files/annexes_eu-us_privacy_shield_en.pdf>.
84A29WP Opinion 01/2016 (n 24) 12.
85A29WP Opinion 01/2016 (n 24) 2.
86A29WP Opinion 01/2016 (n 24) 2.
87Sidley, ‘Privacy Shield: Essentially Equivalent’ (July 2016) <http://www.sidley.com/~/media/publications/privacy-shield-
essentially-equivalent.pdf> 3; Shara Monteleone and Laura Puccio, From Safe Harbour to Privacy Shield: Advances and
Shortcomings of the New EU-US Data Transfer Rules (European Parliament, January 2017) 18, 19.




































better enforcement system maintaining an enhanced transparency, effective redress
mechanisms and more safeguards from the surveillance measures.89
The Privacy Shield not only followed the mandates under DPD but also has taken into
account the provisions of the GDPR, although some important principles of EU data pro-
tection law are not substantially reflected.90 There are some practical complexities as well
that need to be solved efficiently.
It is a matter of concern that the Privacy Shield authorises the US authorities to transfer
the data received from the EU to other third countries. Because the state systems of other
third countries may vary from one to another, it is not possible to predict those from a
specific point of time. If, for example, data are transferred to a country having dictatorship
with an arbitrary surveillance system on electronic media and communication, then the EU
data will fall under threat. In such circumstances, Chapter V of the GDPR (or Arts. 25 and 26
DPD) should bind the third countries for the intra-group data transfers, which unfortu-
nately are not ensured in the Privacy Shield.91 However, it is expected that the Privacy
Shield would take into account this issue soon.92
Some principles of the Privacy Shield are already criticised, such as the ‘self-certification’
provision, the Ombudsman position bearing doubtful independence93 and the 45-days
notification requirement for data breaches.94 The language and arrangement of the
Privacy Shield are argued to be a bit ambiguous, inconsistent, unclear and difficult to
understand in some respects. Because many terms are interpreted differently in the EU
and the United States, and some terminologies are different but mean the same matter
in those two territories, it is very important to explain every confusing term with clear defi-
nitions.95 For example, privacy on the Internet or right to erasure are understood differ-
ently in the EU and the United States.96
It is important to remember that, by processing personal data, a data controller may
also be a data processor. The term ‘data processor’ [Art. 4(8) GDPR] does not necessarily
mean ‘data controller’ [Art. 4(7) GDPR] because ‘the purposes and means of the processing
of personal data’ are determined by the controller, and the data processor will not enjoy
that power while it becomes a separate entity (only processor).97 To determine and regu-
late the activities of such data processors for example, organisations, companies or agents
receiving data from the EU to the United States for the purpose of processing, some
specific and clear provisions are required in the Privacy Shield, which is still absent.98 Limit-
ing data retention is a basic feature of the European data protection law [Art. 6(1)(e) DPD
and Recital 39, Art. 5(1)(e) GDPR]. Such a provision within the meaning of keeping data ‘no
longer than is necessary’ is absent in the Privacy Shield.99
89Weiss and Archick (n 49) 10.
90For example, point 6(146) and footnotes 16 and 208 of the Commission Implementing Decision.
91A29WP Opinion 01/2016 (n 24) 20–22.
92Monteleone and Puccio (n 87) 35.
93Monteleone and Puccio (n 87) 32.
94‘Get Privacy Shield Wrong and It Will Have to be Renegotiated in 2018 Warns Data Protection Lawyer’ (March 2016)
<http://technewsrss.com/get-privacy-shield-wrong-and-it-will-have-to-be-renegotiated-in-2018-warns-data-protection-
lawyer/>.
95A29WP Opinion 01/2016 (n 24) 12–14.
96Stretton and Grest (n 71).
97Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of “controller” and “Processor” (16 February
2010).
98A29WP Opinion 01/2016 (n 24) 16.
99A29WP Opinion 01/2016 (n 24) 17.



































There are some exceptions to the Privacy Shield principles under which legal obligation
of data protection could be limited on the grounds of ‘national security, public interest, or
law enforcement requirements; by statute, government regulation or case law that creates
conflicting obligations or explicit authorizations’.100 From the EU side, such provision also
keeps scope of ambiguity to determine the exact extent of exemption from legal obli-
gation. For that purpose, the EU authorities need to be cognisant about the US law.101
Because the future impacts of the GDPR are still unforeseen, the Privacy Shield should
be subject to review and amendment considering the application and acceptance of the
GDPR.102 However, the Privacy Shield keeps the flexibility of annual review and joint
dispute resolutions to be updated with time and for solving probable complexities. As a
paradox, the very flexible nature of an agreement may turn it difficult for concerned
legal activists to rely on and investigate properly the related practicalities.103 The joint
review mechanism, as prescribed in the Privacy Shield, is a good initiative, though the pro-
vision needs more clarification. Some regional contact point in the EU is required for an
effective resolution mechanism.104
With the emergence of the GDPR and now the EU-US Privacy Shield in a contemporary
time period, a new era in data protection regime is about to begin.105 It is a time of concern
and uncertainty whether the GDPR and Privacy Shield will proceed in harmony or some
conflict will arise.106 The EU authorities sketched the GDPR targeting personal data and
privacy protection of EU residents in the changing digital environment. At the same
time, with strengthening the harmonised ‘one-stop-shop’ principle, the GDPR facilitates
business aspects of the EU Member States in connection with personal data protection
both inside and outside the EU.107 On the other hand, the Privacy Shield is an attempt
to simplify business between the EU and the United States in a digitalised environment.
Unavoidably, it has to take into consideration both the EU and US legislations.
It is important to remember that the Privacy Shield is not a legislation but an agree-
ment. Normally, the US-based giant multinational technology companies are not bound
to implement this decision unless they subscribe to it.108 But the universal spread of IT
business services necessitates the subscription to the Privacy Shield in order to deal
with the cross-border data flows between the EU and the United States. Under such cir-
cumstances, subscriptions of hundreds of US-based multinational companies (including
Facebook, Google and Microsoft) to the present Privacy Shield decision implies that
they care for the EU data protection law in case of transatlantic data transfer.109
After the failure of the Safe Harbour Agreement, in spite of both the visible advantages
and limitations of the Privacy Shield at this point in time, how the transnational data flow
100Annex II.I.5 of the Annexes to the Commission Implementing Decision.
101A29WP Opinion 01/2016 (n 24) 17.
102A29WP Opinion 01/2016 (n 24) 15; Sidley (n 87) 6.
103Stretton and Grest (n 71).
104A29WP Opinion 01/2016 (n 24) 3, 4.
105Stretton and Grest (n 71).
106Stretton and Grest (n 71).
107Stretton and Grest (n 71).
108Sidley (n 87) 3.
109Kevin Townsend, ‘Google Signs Up For EU/U.S. Privacy Shield’ Security Week (6 September 2016) <http://www.
securityweek.com/google-signs-euus-privacy-shield>; James Titcomb, ‘Facebook Signs Up to Privacy Shield Data





































between the EU and the United States would be tackled, and how the GDPR will interface
with Privacy Shield is still uncertain and complex. The most challenging task may currently
be to hold a practical and business-oriented look at implementing the Privacy Shield.
5. Conclusion
If people receive suggestions from Google, Facebook, etc. based on their previous online
and, very surprisingly, even offline activities, then the total system seems very vague,
having a lack of openness, transparency and accountability under a process of surveil-
lance. Under such vagueness and overreaching dominance of the giant technology com-
panies, it is possible to process personal data by operating from any part of the world and
targeting users in any part of the world. Even it is not always easy to know when or who
processes data, for what purpose and the exact amount and nature of the processing.
An improved legal basis is sought to be established with the introduction of updated
provisions in the GDPR, which is expected to be effective in jurisdictional scope and
cross-border data transfer issues, especially, for introducing clear and modernised pro-
visions. The EU data protection law’s international application in EU data subjects’ personal
data processing and cross-border data transfer is secured with strong and unambiguous
provisions through GDPR.
It is now clear that the EU authorities tried their best to frame EU data protection
measures in line with the technological expansion in practice.110 If a website or application
becomes available in any part of the EU, it may be brought under the ambit of the EU data
protection law, irrespective of the web or app developers’ place of origin when processing
EU users’ personal data, thereby making a link to the EU. With the GDPR, the regulatory
landscape is extended by benefiting businesses and recommending protection of per-
sonal data by both the EU- and non-EU-based companies and both inside and outside
the EU in the Digital Single Market.111
With regards to international data transfer, although the GDPR updates legal obli-
gations with some new concepts, it has not brought massive changes over the existing
provisions in the DPD.112 The same applies for the Privacy Shield, which many believe is
an upgrade to the Safe Harbour Agreement.113
However, the advancements in information and communication law have just started.
In the coming years, it is probable to face new situations and technologies that demand
new interpretation of laws and produce numerous case laws.114
From the EU users’ points of view, the EU data protection law provides efficient protec-
tion of privacy against unlawful personal data processing. However, if we explain from
110Thompson Hine, ‘European Union Imposes Extraterritorial Privacy Obligations on U.S. Businesses’ (16 May 2014) <file://
atkk/home/b/bupasha/Desktop/Extra%20territorial/Internet%20material/EU-extraterritorial%20privacy%20obligations%
20on%20U.S.%20businesses%20-%20Lexology.html>.
111Pietro Franzina, ‘The EU General Data Protection Regulation: A Look at the Provisions that Deal Specifically with Cross-
border Situations’ Conflict of Laws.net (10 May 2016) < http://conflictoflaws.net/2016/the-eu-general-data-protection-
regulation-a-look-at-the-provisions-that-deal-specifically-with-cross-border-situations/>.
112Tobias Bräutigam, ‘The Land of Confusion: International Data Transfers Between Schrems and the GDPR’ in Tobias Bräu-
tigam and Samuli Miettinen (eds) Data Protection, Privacy and European Regulation in the Digital Age (FORUM IURIS,
Faculty of Law, University of Helsinki, 2016) 168, 169.
113Natasha Lomas, ‘EU-US Privacy Shield Now Officially Adopted but Criticisms Linger’ (12 July 2016) <https://techcrunch.
com/2016/07/12/eu-us-privacy-shield-now-officially-adopted-but-criticisms-linger/>.
114Bräutigam (n 112) 169.



































non-EU-based, for example, US-based online platforms’ standpoints when their services
are used within the territory of the EU, it may become complicated for them to define
their legal obligation in processing personal data. Ultimately and theoretically they are
bound to comply with both the EU and US data protection laws, including the data pro-
tection laws of all the respective Member States in question.115
In the absence of any universally accepted international data protection law in spite of
the worldwide reach of the Internet, the EU data protection law holds the leading position
globally when personal data processing of EU nationals/residents are concerned. Ironically,
this EU-focused approach of the EU data protection law can be described as a limitation to
be ‘international’ for the people in all parts of the world in the sense that it does not
provide redress for non-EU citizens and GDPR only protects data subjects in the EU.116
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